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NOTES
NORTH CAROLINA AND PRETRIAL CIVIL REVOCA-
TION OF AN IMPAIRED DRIVER'S LICENSE AND THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
Any person charged with driving while impaired in North
Carolina,I or who refuses to submit to a chemical analysis,2 is sub-
1. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1 (1993 & Supp. 1995) in relevant part states:
(a) Offense-A person commits the offense of impaired driving if he
drives any vehicle upon any highway, any street, or any public
vehicular area within this State:
(1) While under the influence of an impairing substance; or
(2) After having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any
relevant time after the driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08
or more.
2. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2 (1993 & Supp. 1995) provides in relevant part:
(a) Basis for Charging Officer to Require Chemical Analysis;
Notification of Rights-Any person who drives a vehicle on a
highway or public vehicular area thereby gives consent to a
chemical analysis if charged with an implied-consent offense. The
charging officer must designate the type of chemical analysis to be
administered, and it may be administered when the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that the person charged has
committed the implied-consent offense.
Except as provided in this subsection . . . before any type of
chemical analysis is administered the person charged must be
taken before a chemical analyst authorized to administer a test of a
person's breath, who must inform the person orally and also give
the person a notice in writing that:
(1) The person has a right to refuse to be tested.
(2) Refusal to take any required test or tests will result in an
immediate revocation of the person's driving privilege for at least
10 days and an additional 12-month revocation by the Division of
Motor Vehicles.
(3) The test results, or the fact of the peron's refusal, will be
admissible in evidence at trial on the offense charged.
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ject to an immediate civil license revocation.3 In addition to the
immediate license revocation, the individual is subject to criminal
prosecution for the offense of "Impaired Driving. "4
In North Carolina and across the country6 this common stat-
utory scheme has come under increasing attack by defendants
charged with driving while impaired. The argument is that the
civil license revocation of those charged with impaired driving
constitutes "punishment" for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause,7 and thus a subsequent criminal prosecution for the
offense of impaired driving is barred. Some defendants in North
Carolina have successfully used this defense at the superior court
level to prevent the State from proceeding with a criminal prose-
cution.' On May 8, 1996 the North Carolina Supreme Court deliv-
ered its opinion on the issue.9
(4) The person's driving privilege will be revoked immediately for
at least 10 days if-
a. The test reveals an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more; or
b. The person was driving a commercial motor vehicle and the
test reveals an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more.
3. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5(b) (1993 & Supp. 1995), in relevant part states:
(b) Revocation for Persons Who Refuse Chemical Analyses or Have
Alcohol Concentrations of 0.08 or More After Driving a Motor
Vehicle or of 0.04 or More After Driving a Commercial Vehicle.-A
persons driver's license is subject to revocation under this section if.
(4) The person:
a. Willfully refuses to submit to the chemical analysis;
b. Has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within a
relevant time after the driving; or
c. Has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more at any
relevant time after the driving of a commercial vehicle.
This article contemplates a double jeopardy challenge only in those cases
where the defendant actually submitted to chemical analysis and registered an
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. A refusal by a defendant to submit to the
chemical analysis appears to give rise to a separate offense and thus would not
qualify for Double Jeopardy protection.
4. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1 (1993).
5. See Michael Dayton, Failed D.W.I. Defense To Get Review By Appeals
Court, N.C. LAw. WKLY., August 21, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Dayton].
6. See Harvey Berkman, Double Jeopardy Downs D. U.I. Cases, NAT'L L.J.,
June 26, 1995, at A7.
7. The Double Jeopardy Clause states in part: "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb... " U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
8. See Dayton, supra note 5.
9. State v. Oliver, 470 S.E.2d 16, 1996 WL 240074 (N.C., May 8, 1996).
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Section II of this comment introduces the reader to the three
primary United States Supreme Court decisions that encouraged
the use of the Double Jeopardy defense in D.W.I. cases. Section
III examines how courts in other states have dealt with the
defense, and Section IV discusses the recent North Carolina
Supreme Court decision.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECISION THAT GAVE DRUNK
DRIVERS A SHOT
It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
tects an individual from three separate abuses: "it protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.
It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the
same offense."10 The third protection is implicated in civil license
revocation cases, and it is this protection on which the United
States Supreme Court focused in United States v. Halper."
In Halper, the Court confronted the issue of whether a civil
penalty can constitute "punishment" for the purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.12 Mr. Halper was the manager of a com-
pany which provided health care services for individuals eligible
to receive Medicare benefits. Halper submitted 65 separate false
claims for reimbursement under the Medicare program and his
company received $585 more than it deserved. 13 Mr. Halper was
convicted under the criminal false-claims statute,' 4 fined $5,000
and sentenced to a term of two years in prison.
After Halper's conviction the government instituted an action
against Mr. Halper under the False Claims Act. 15 The district
court imposed civil liability on Halper based on the facts estab-
lished at his criminal trial. 16 Under the Act Halper was liable for
a civil penalty of: 1. $2,000 per violation, 2. two times the amount
of damages sustained by the government as a result of his con-
10. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
11. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 437. The government reimbursed the company $12 a claim when
the company was entitled only to $3 a claim. This overpayment resulted from
Mr. Halper's "mischaracterization" of the services rendered. Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994).
15. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994).
16. United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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duct, and 3. the cost of civil litigation.17 Thus, Halper was liable
to the government for $130,000.
The district court determined that this amount would consti-
tute punishment. Therefore, since Halper had already been con-
victed and punished, the government could not extract a penalty
in that amount from Halper without violating the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause's prohibition on multiple punishments for the same
offense.' The district court concluded that a civil penalty
designed to make the government whole would constitute "punish-
ment" for double jeopardy analysis where the amount intended to
compensate the government was not "rationally related" to the
government's actual damages and expenses. 19 Ultimately, the
district court imposed liability on Halper only for double damages
($1,170) and the costs of civil litigation.2 0 On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court the government argued that prior cases
established that civil sanctions cannot implicate the Double Jeop-
ardy clause. 21 The Court rejected this argument:
The relevant teachings of these [prior] cases is that the Govern-
ment is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand
compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as
reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double dam-
ages, without being deemed to have imposed a second punishment
for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. These cases do not tell
us, because the problem was not presented in them, what the Con-
stitution commands when one of those imprecise formulas autho-
rizes a supposedly remedial sanction that does not remotely
17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994). The False Claims Amendment Act of 1986
changed the civil penalty to "not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000,
plus 3 times the amount of damages that the government sustains because of the
act of that person" as well as "the costs of a civil action brought to recover any
such penalty or damages." 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994).
18. Halper, 660 F. Supp. at 533-34.
19. Id. at 533. To avoid the constitutional problem presented, the district
court read the $2,000 per violation provision to be discretionary and imposed full
liability for only eight counts, and entered judgment for the government in the
amount of $16,000. However, the government moved for reconsideration and the
court admitted that it was in error by holding the $2,000 per violation as
discretionary, but still refused to impose full liability on Halper. Halper's
ultimate liability did not include any of the mandatory $2,000 per violation
penalty. United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
20. Halper, 664 F. Supp. at 855.
21. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441.
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approximate the Government's damages and actual costs, and
rough justice becomes clear injustice.22
The Court also rejected the government's argument that pun-
ishment is imposed only in criminal proceedings, and the conten-
tion that whether a proceeding is civil or criminal is a matter of
statutory construction.23 The Court held that while reliance on
statutory language, structure, and intent is valuable for identify-
ing the nature of the proceeding or determining what constitu-
tional safeguards apply to the proceeding, "the approach is not
well suited to the context of the 'humane interests' safeguarded by
the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple punish-
ments."24 Hence, a violation of this "intrinsically personal" right 25
"requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and
the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve."26 The
Court was quick to note however, that this question was not to be
decided from the perspective of the defendant since even remedial
sanctions "carry the sting of punishment."27
The label given to a sanction ("civil"/"criminal") is "not of par-
amount importance" when assessing whether the sanction is pun-
ishment.28 A civil sanction "constitutes punishment when the
sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of pun-
ishment."29 Those goals are "retribution and deterrence."30 The
Court held that:
under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has
been punished in a criminal prosecution 31 may not be subjected to
22. Id. at 446 (emphasis added). Note that the italicized portion of the quote
is a clear statement that the Court will not demand the government compute
only it's exact damages. The Court does not even seem concerned with how the
Government arrives at a figure so long as that figure does not approach "clear
injustice." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 446-47 (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 447.
26. Id. at 448.
27. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, n.7.
28. Id. at 448.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. A question which immediately comes to the forefront is whether the order
of events is critical. The holding in Halper deals with a situation where the
defendant has already been convicted in a criminal proceeding. Halper, 490 U.S.
at 448-49. In a license revocation situation the summary revocation occurs
before any criminal proceeding is instituted. The consensus seems to be that the
order of events does not and should not matter. United States v. Sanchez-
1996] 395
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an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction
may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent
or retribution.32
The Supreme Court then went on to state that this was a
"rule for the rare case, the case such as the one before [the Court],
where a fixed penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the
damages he has caused."33
In Austin v. United States,3 4 the Supreme Court revisited
Halper. Although Austin did not involve the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Court did have to determine whether a federal in rem
forfeiture statute constituted punishment.3 5 Mr. Austin had been
Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 123 (1992)
(stating "the Halper principle that a civil penalty can be factored into the double
jeopardy matrix should apply whether the civil penalty precedes or follows the
criminal proceeding"); United States v. Marcus Schloss and Co., 724 F. Supp.
1123, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Halper) (stating "if in fact a civil sanction
may fairly be characterized 'only as a deterrent or retribution'. . . then its
exaction before imposition of criminal punishment should have the same double
jeopardy effect as exaction afterwards"); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 514 (Vt.
1992) (same); see 46 OKLA. L. REV. 587, 600 (1993) for an extensive discussion of
this issue. But cf., Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937,
1947, n.21 (1994) (stating "[t]his statute therefore does not raise the question
whether an ostensibly civil proceeding that is designed to inflict punishment may
bar a subsequent proceeding that is admittedly criminal in character").
32. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (emphasis added). In the sentence
immediately prior to the express holding the Court wrote:
[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to
understand the term.
Id. at 448.
When read in conjunction with the Court's explicit holding the above quoted
statement creates confusion. Is any civil sanction that carries some deterrent
purpose automatically punishment? The express holding of the Court simply
does not go that far. The question is whether the sanction "may not fairly be
characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Id. (emphasis
added). See State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
33. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
34. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). The question presented in Austin was whether the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to forfeitures of
property under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7) (1988). The Court held that the
Excessive Fines Clause does apply in in rem civil forfeiture proceedings because
forfeitures have historically been understood to be punishment. Austin, 113 S.
Ct. at 2801.
35. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2801.
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arrested possessing "small amounts of marijuana and cocaine, " "
and the Government subsequently sought forfeiture of his mobile
home and auto body shop.37 The Court, looking to Halper, stated
that, "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving
either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment as we
have come to understand the term."83 However, the Court's anal-
ysis differed somewhat from Halper:
In Halper, we focused on whether "the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goals of punishment." In this case how-
ever, it makes sense to focus on [the statute] as a whole. Halper
involved a small fixed-penalty provision, which "in the ordinary
case ... can be said to do no more than make the government
whole." The value of the conveyances and real property forfeitable
under [the statute], on the other hand, can vary so dramatically
that any relationship between the Government's actual costs and
the amount of the sanction is merely coincidental. 9
The Court relied almost solely on the fact that forfeiture stat-
utes historically have been understood as punishment and the
statutes in question did nothing to change that perception.4"
Thus, the federal forfeiture statute41 which provided for the forfei-
ture of property used or intended to be used in drug offenses 42 was
"punishment" for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause.4 3
More recently the Court dealt with the double jeopardy issue
in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch," where
the Court subjected Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act to double
jeopardy inquiry.45 The State of Montana imposed a tax totalling
36. Id. at 2803.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2812 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The reader will note
that this is not the express holding in Halper, thus adding to the confusion
surrounding this issue. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
39. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812, n.14 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 2811.
41. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7) (1988).
42. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811-12.
43. Id. at 2811.
44. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
45. Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act imposed a tax in a separate
proceeding on individuals who had been convicted of violating the Act. Id. at
1942. The civil proceeding was based on the same underlying offense. The tax
was 10% of the market value or a set price depending on the drug. The Kurths
were sentenced to prison, and forfeited cash and equipment used in the drug
operation, valued at approximately $18,000. Id.
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$900,000 on the Kurths after their criminal conviction. The Court
reaffirmed the express holding in Halper:
we held [in Halper] that "a defendant who already has been pun-
ished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an addi-
tional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution".
46
Once again the Court stated that a legislature's characteriza-
tion of a statute as "civil" does not control for purposes of double
jeopardy analysis.4'7 However, the Court loosened its strict hold-
ing in Austin stating that "neither a high rate of taxation nor an
obvious deterrent purpose automatically marks this tax a form of
punishment."48 These two factors alone were not enough to trans-
form the tax into "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, but
under Austin it appears that they would have been.4 9
However, here again the Court did not use Halper's remedial
v. punitive test.50 Rather the Court focused in on the unusual
characteristics of the tax to determine that the "tax is fairly char-
acterized as punishment."5 ' Thus, Kurth Ranch is important
because it stands for the proposition that a civil sanction, even if it
46. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945, 1948. Why did the Court not use the
express holding of Halper in Austin? See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Whatever the reason, given the express holding in Halper and then the
reaffirmation of that holding in Kurth Ranch, reliance on the language in Austin
would seem to be misplaced, or at the very least on unstable ground. See
Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hanson, 532
N.W.2d 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
47. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945.
48. Id. at 1946 (emphasis added). The Court stated: "That the Montana
Legislature intended the tax to deter people from possessing marijuana is beyond
question. The D.O.R. reminds us, however, that many taxes that are presumed
valid, such as taxes on cigarettes and alcohol, are also both high and motivated to
some extent by an interest in deterrence." Id.
49. At this point it -looks even more like the language in Austin was an
anomaly. See supra notes 32 and 46.
50. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947-48. That test would be an analysis of
whether the penalty is imposed for actual costs to the state that are attributable
to the defendant's conduct or in other words, whether the sanction is rationally
related to the damages the government suffered. See supra pp. 3-9.
51. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947-48. The factors in addition to the high
rate of taxation and obvious deterrent purpose that the court considered were: 1.
conditioned on commission of crime, 2. tax levied on goods that the taxpayer
neither owned nor possessed when the tax was imposed (the taxed items had
been seized). Id.
398 [Vol. 18:391
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serves some deterrent purpose, may withstand double jeopardy
analysis if it can still be "fairly characterized" as remedial.52
It is clear from these decisions that a civil sanction may be
deemed punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
What is not clear is what kind of test should be used where the
sanction imposed is not monetary. Kurth Ranch seems to offer
some help, but how have the states applied the Halper holding in
the license revocation context?
III. THIS MIGHT STING A LITTLE-LICENSE REVOCATION AND
THE HALPER HOLDING IN THE STATES
North Carolina is not the first state since the decision in
Halper to be faced with a challenge to its license revocation
scheme on double jeopardy grounds. Almost all of the appellate
level courts in other states have held that pretrial civil license rev-
ocation based on an impaired driving offense does not constitute
"punishment" for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 3
Halper's remedial v. punitive 54 test simply cannot apply in
the context of license revocations. 55 Thus, the state courts gener-
ally have focused on the language in Halper calling for a "particu-
larized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that
the penalty may fairly be said to serve".56
Courts have consistently held that the statutes authorizing
license revocation for impaired driving historically serve the reme-
52. Id.
53. State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); State v. Nichols, 819
P.2d 995 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Ellis v. Pierce, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991); Davidson v. Mackinnon, 656 So. 2d 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 415 (1993); State v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928 (Haw. 1995) reconsideration denied,
902 P.2d 976 (1995); Butler v. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790
(La. 1992); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265 (Me. 1995); Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d
199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); State v. Parker, 538 N.W.2d 141 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995); State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Young,
530 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. App. 1995); State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Misc.
1995); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510 (Vt. 1992). Contra Ohio v Gustafron, 1995
WL 387619 (Ohio App. Dist. 7 June 27, 1995).
54. See supra note 50.
55. "The notion of a sanction being remedial in the sense meant by Halper
connotes redress to an injured party." Ellis v. Pierce, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
56. See e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); State v.
Parker, 538 N.W.2d 141 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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dial purpose of protecting the public, and thus do not constitute
"punishment" under Halper.57 As one Florida Appellate Court
recently stated:
[T]he administrative remedy of suspending a driver's license
because of drunk driving or other related behavior was and contin-
ues to be primarily for the purpose of enhancing safe driving on
the public highways. Its effect is remedial in a general or univer-
sal sense, because it removes dangerous drivers from the high-
ways. And it can also be viewed remedial for the individual, since
in an intoxicated state, a driver poses a serious danger to himself
or herself as well as to others. As such it is no more punitive than
denying a person who is legally blind a driver's license. Both will
live longer and healthier lives if they do not drive.5"
Some courts have drawn a parallel between the revocation of a
driver's license and that of professional licenses. 59
However, it is also clear that the revocation of an individual's
license will have a deterrent effect on not only that individual, but
others as well. 60 Does this deterrent impact require that civil
license revocations which have historically been understood as
remedial must be transformed into "punishment" under Halper?
The answer consistently has been "no".61 In State v. Zerke162 the
Court of Appeals of Alaska explained:
[Tihe monetary penalty at issue in Halper was ostensibly intended
to compensate the government for monetary loss stemming from
Halper's fraud. In such a context, the Supreme Court could justifi-
ably state that the government's declared aim of restitution had to
be divorced from the aim of deterrence.
57. See supra note 53.
58. Davidson v. Mackinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. App. 1995). See also,
State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). In Zerkel the court stated:
[I]t is clear that administrative suspension or revocation of a driver's
license has traditionally been viewed, not as punishment for a driver's
criminal offense or traffic violations, but as a remedial action prompted
by the need to protect the public by removing dangerous drivers from
the roads.
Id. at 755.
59. See State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995) (stating that "[wie
analogize the driver's license to professional licensing and certification which if
abused may be revoked in the name of public safety"). See also, Ellis v. Pierce,
282 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
60. See Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199, 203 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
61. See supra note 53.
62. 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
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In Kurth Ranch, on the other hand, the Supreme Court recognized
that other types of non-punitive sanctions could legitimately
include deterrent aspects ... Instead of asking whether Montana's
tax was intended to deter people from using illegal drugs the
Court asked whether Montana's tax departed so far from normal
revenue laws as to become a form of punishment.6"
The states appear to fall into two categories in relation to how
they conclude that the deterrent effect of license revocations does
not transform the revocation into "punishment" under Halper.
The first approach is that since license revocations histori-
cally have been understood as remedial,64 the deterrent impact is
simply the "sting of punishment" which might accompany reme-
dial statutes as explained in Halper.6 5  The Hawaii Supreme
Court chose this approach:
Although license revocation may, from [the defendant's] point of
view, "carry the sting of punishment," as stated by the Supreme
Court in Halper, "whether a sanction constitutes punishment is
not determined from the defendant's perspective, as even remedial
sanctions carry the 'sting of punishment'." 6
In Johnson v. State,67 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
held, "the mere fact that the suspension of driving privileges may
carry the 'sting of punishment' is immaterial."6 1 In State v.
Savard,69 the Supreme Court of Maine explained:
[A]ny punitive or deterrent purpose served by the suspension of an
operator's driver's license following an arrest for [impaired driv-
ing] is merely incidental to the overriding purpose intended by the
legislature to provide the public with safe roadways. Although we
acknowledge that any suspension may have a deterrent effect on
63. Id. at 756-57 (citations omitted).
64. Note that this is similar to the analysis in Austin where the Court relied
in large part on the historical perception of forfeiture statutes as punitive.
65. To refresh the reader's memory, the Supreme Court wrote:
[Ojur cases have acknowledged that for the defendant even remedial
sanctions carry the sting of punishment . . .we hold merely that in
determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal
punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the sanction in
question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the
sanction, that must be evaluated.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, n.7 (citations omitted).
66. State v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995) reconsideration denied, 902
P.2d 976 (1995) (citations omitted).
67. 622 A.2d 199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
68. Id. at 205.
69. 659 A.2d 1265 (Me. 1995).
1996] 401
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the law-abiding public, our analysis does not focus on that per-
spective. In the eyes of the defendant even remedial sanctions
may carry a "sting of punishment."7 °
This approach falls short of Halper's call for a "particularized
assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the pen-
alty may fairly be said to serve."71
Other courts have confronted the punitive effect head on,
rather than dismissing it as the mere "sting of punishment."
These courts focus in on the "rare case"72 and "overwhelmingly
disproportionate"73 language in Halper. From this the courts
have determined that the revocation is not so divorced from the
historically recognized remedial goal of the statutes as to render it
"punishment."7 4 For example, in Butler v. Department of Public
Safety & Corrections,75 the Supreme Court of Louisiana held:
Unlike Halper's disproportionate fine, Butler's license suspension
is temporary (90 days), the last 60 days of which he will be able to
obtain a restricted license. Furthermore, Butler's license suspen-
sion, in contrast to Halper's fine, bears a rational relationship to
the legitimate governmental purpose of promoting public safety on
Louisiana highways.7"
In holding that license revocations in the impaired driving
context did not constitute punishment, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals stated:
Halper requires a particularized assessment of the penalty
imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to
serve... The implied consent driver's license revocation provision
serves public safety by removing drunken drivers from the high-
ways pending the judicial hearing .... The 90-day license revoca-
tion suffered by these defendants is certainly not "overwhelmingly
disproportionate" to the public safety interest at stake ....
Neither the character of the implied consent sanction, a driver's
70. Id. at 1268.
71. See infra section II.
72. 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (stating that "[w]hat we announce now is a rule
for the rare case, the case such as the one before us, where a fixed penalty
provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction
overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused").
73. Id.
74. See e.g., Butler v. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790 (La.
1992); State v. Spilde, 536 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Hanson,
532 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. App. 1995); State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. 1995).
75. 609 So. 2d 790 (La. 1992).
76. Id. at 794.
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license revocation, nor the 90-day length of the sanction in this
case prevents it from being "fairly . . . characterized as
remedial."77
This type of analysis more fully addresses the relevant issues
after Halper than does a terse declaration that any deterrent
effect a license revocation statute may carry is merely the "sting of
punishment." Under a Butler type analysis a court can explain
the historical remedial nature of the statutes, admit that they also
do serve some deterrent purpose, but then dismiss this as not con-
trolling under Halper and Kurth Ranch because the sanction is
not "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the offense. 78 The hold-
ings in Kurth Ranch and Halper appear to require this much from
a reviewing court.79 The "sting of punishment" argument carries
considerably more weight once the relationship between the stat-
ute and the triggering act has been established.
No matter which rationale is used, appellate courts in other
states have not been receptive to the argument that license revo-
cations constitute "punishment" under Halper.e0
IV. LICENSE REVOCATIONS AND THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY DEFENSE
IN NORTH CAROLINA STATE V. OLIVER81
On May 10, 1996 the North Carolina Supreme Court issued
its opinion in State v. Oliver, 8 2 a case challenging North Carolina's
ten-day administrative license revocation on double jeopardy
grounds.8 3 Justice Lake, writing for the Court, briefly discussed
Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch. The issue before the Court was
whether the automatic revocation "cannot fairly be said to serve a
remedial purpose because the revocation also serves the goals of
77. State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); See also,
State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195 (Bowling Green Mun. Ct. 1995) (stating
"Halper and Kurth Ranch combine to emphasize the rule that civil penalties are
not punishment, but there may be an exception in rare and extreme cases where
the sanctions may... qualify as equivalent to criminal punishment.") Id. at 201.
78. See e.g. Butler v. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Correction, 609 So. 2d 790 (La.
1992).
79. See supra section II.
80. See supra note 53.
81. 470 S.E.2d 16, 1996 WL 240074 (N.C., May 8, 1996).
82. Id. The defendant had been convicted in Alamance County Superior Court
after a chemical analysis of his breath showed an alcohol concentration of 0.08.
83. This case was heard on discretionary review prior to any determination in
the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
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punishment such that defendant's subsequent conviction for DWI
amounts to a second punishment...s 4
In holding that the license revocation did not rise to the level
of punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis the
Court began by emphasizing that the North Carolina Supreme
Court has traditionally viewed license revocations as a remedial
measure.
85
In particular, the Court discussed Henry v. Edmisten8 6, a case
challenging North Carolina's ten-day adminstrative revocation,
but on grounds other than double jeopardy.8 7 In Henry, the Court
stated that the "ten-day revocation.., promotes the State's impor-
tant police function of protecting the safety of its people."" Reli-
ance on these prior cases, and Henry in particular, is troubling
given Halper's declaration that double jeopardy analysis requires
a "particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the pur-
poses that the penalty may fairly be said to serve." 9
However, perhaps in anticipation of the scrutiny that would
accompany a decision merely affirming pre-Halper decisions the
Court was quick to recognize that Henry did not involve the
double jeopardy analysis, but nonetheless the Court found the
"analysis and conclusion that [license revocation] is remedial"
compelling.90
The Court next confronted commentary contained in the legis-
lative history of North Carolina General Statute § 20-16.5:
This [revocation] provision serves a couple functions important to
the governor and the proponents of the bill. First, it provides an
immediate slap in the face to virtually all drivers charged with a
D.W.I. Second, the fact that it is imposed independent of the trial
on the criminal charge makes it more certain that a sanction will
be imposed regardless of the defendant's status or his lawyer's
expertise. 9
1
84. 1996 WL 240074, *3.
85. See Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979); State v.
Carlisle, 285 N.C. 229, 204 S.E.2d 15 (1974).
86. 470 S.E.2d 16, 1996 WL 240074, *3 (N.C., May 8, 1996).
87. Henry presented a challenge to North Carolina's ten-day revocation on
Due Process and Equal Protection grounds.
88. Henry, 315 N.C. 474, 481, 340 S.E.2d 720, 729.
89. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
90. 470 S.E.2d 16, 1996 WL 240074, *4 (N.C., May 8, 1996).
91. Id., (quoting "Impaired Driving: The Safe Roads Act," A Summary of
Legislation In The 1983 General Assembly Of Interest To North Carolina Public
Officials 117 (1983)).
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The defendant's position was that this language established
that the statute was intended solely to punish those drivers who
violated the statute. 92 This argument has been presented in at
least two other states with no success, 93 and in Hehry, when con-
fronted with the very same language, the Court refused to rely on
the "intent of individual proponents."9 4 Not surprisingly, in the
present case the Court simply deferred to Henry and dismissed
the argument once again.
This result actually seems to be entirely consistent with
Halper, given the declaration in that case that recourse to statu-
tory language, structure, and intent is not appropriate for deter-
mining whether a sanction is actually remedial.95 If the intent of
individual legislators is insufficient to establish the remedial char-
acter of a statute it logically should be insufficient to establish
conclusively the punitive character of a statute. This is especially
so given Halper's declaration that the court is to conduct "a partic-
ularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that
the penalty may fairly be said to serve."9 6
The Court's strongest argument was a Butler type analysis
where the Court compared sanctions at issue in Halper with those
challenged in the present case.97 The Court highlighted Halper's
pronouncement that the decision was a "rule for the rare case," 98
properly invoked in cases where a defendant was subjected to
sanctions "overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he
92. Id.
93. See State v. Fox, No. MV94 31 52 60, 1995 WL 55900 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1995) (Stating "the language used by the legislators... is not controlling) Id. at
*3. See also, Davidson v. Mackinnon, 656 S.E.2d 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
94. Henry, 340 S.E.2d at 734.
95. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, (1989):
[Wihile recourse to statutory language, structure, and intent is
appropriate in identifying the inherent nature of a proceeding, or in
determining the constitutional safeguards that must accompany those
proceedings as a general matter, the approach is not well suited to the
context of the humane interests safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause's proscription of multiple punishments. This constitutional
protection is intrinsically personal. Its violation can be identified only by
assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the
individual by the machinery of the state.
Id. at 447.
96. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
97. See infra Section II.
98. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
4051996]
15
Tyrey: North Carolina and Pretrial Civil Revocation of an Impaired Drive
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
has caused."99 The Court then concluded that North Carolina's
ten-day revocation and $50 restoration fee did not present the
type of "overwhelmingly disproportionate" sanctions that Halper
was intended to prevent. 100
If the purpose of the statute is to protect the public from the
dangers posed by drunk drivers why is the revocation for ten-days
rather than a shorter period such as 24 hours? Obviously this
would serve the purpose of the statute by allowing a drunk driver
to sober up, thus alleviating the danger of harm that accompanies
driving while impaired. A close reading of Halper and Kurth
Ranch seems to reveal the answer. The North Carolina Supreme
Court simply was not required to engage in this kind of exact
determination. The relevant question under Halper and Kurth
Ranch is whether the sanction in question is so "overwhelmingly
disproportionate" that it cannot be "fairly characterized as reme-
dial." With that in mind the Court determined that the ten-day
revocation does not go so far.
Once the Court established that there was a rational relation-
ship between the ten-day revocation and the triggering offense the
Court simply noted Halper's declaration that whether a sanction
constitutes punishment is not to be determined through the eyes
of the defendant, because often "remedial sanctions carry the sting
of punishment."10 1
V. CONCLUSION
Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch taken together leave no
doubt that under certain circumstances civil sanctions may consti-
tute "punishment" for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
However, as the states attempting to apply Halper have demon-
strated, the Halper test for determining remedial v. punitive is
not well suited for the context of license revocations.1 0 2 Halper,
Austin, and Kurth Ranch all dealt with monetary sanctions which
provide a more workable measuring stick than the intangibles
involved in the case of license revocation, e.g. mobility.
Despite the difficulties involved in applying Halper to license
revocation cases it appears that the state courts have devised two
approaches.10 3 The approach that most closely reflects the con-
99. Id.
100. Oliver, 1996 WL 240074, *4.
101. Id. See also infra Section I.
102. See infra Section II.
103. See infra Section III.
406 [Vol. 18:391
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/4
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
cern in Halper10 4 is to focus on the relationship between the goals
of the statute and the sanction imposed to determine whether the
sanction is "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the triggering
act. Only then can a judgment be made as to whether a given
statute may be "fairly ... characterized as remedial."105 This is
the approach that the North Carolina Supreme Court has chosen.
In State v. Oliver, 10 6 the Court ruled that the ten-day admin-
istrative license revocation resulting from a chemical analyisis
revealing an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more does not consti-
tute "punishment" for the purposes of double jeopardy analyisis.
The Court held that the revocation is neither "overwhelmingly dis-
proportionate" as a response to the danger posed by drunk drivers,
nor the kind of "rare case" presented in Halper. 10 7 As such the
statute is "fairly... characterized as remedial" and does not bar a
subsequent prosecution for the offense of Driving While Impaired
in the state of North Carolina.
Marc Tyrey
AUTHOR'S NOTE: During publication of this comment the
United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States
v. Ursery, 1996 WL 340815 (U.S., June 24, 1996). Here the Court
distinguished in rem civil forfeitures from "potentially punitive in
personam civil penalties" and held that the former are neither
"punishment" nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 1996 WL 340815, *11.
While Ursery dealt with in rem civil forfeitures portions of the
opinion seem to be relevant in the context of in personam civil pen-
alties, and particularly to temporary license revocations and the
replacement fee in impaired driving cases.
First, the Court restricted the strict language in Austin to
cases involving the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment. (See Section II for a discussion of Austin).
Second, the Court noted that Halper's test could not be applied in
civil forfeitures because it is impossible to quantify the nonpunitive
purposes served by an in rem civil forfeiture. Therefore, one cannot
determine whether the forfeiture bears a rational relationship to
104. See infra Section II.
105. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1995); see also Dept. of
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994).
106. 470 S.E.2d 16, 1994 WL 240074 (N.C., May 8, 1996).
107. Id.
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the nonpunitive purpose(s) it is intended to serve. The same rea-
soning could easily be used in the license revocation context.
In short, language in Ursery may serve as an indication that
the Court plans to curtail the use of Halper in other areas at some
point in the near future.
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